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The Apollo fallacy and its effect on US energy policy 
Peter Z. Grossman 
 
Abstract 
US Policy makers have made continual references to the Apollo Program as a model for development of 
alternative energy technologies. This model, however, is inappropriate for energy policy, and its use is 
termed the Apollo fallacy. The goal of the Apollo Program was the demonstration of engineering prowess 
while any alternative energy technology must succeed in the marketplace. Several Apollo-like energy 
programs have been tried and all have failed at high cost. It is argued that the use of Apollo has political 
benefits but that it is detrimental to the adoption of potentially effective energy policies. 
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According to many proponents, alternative energy development requires an Apollo Program type 
government commitment. In fact, the analogy to the Apollo Program (or to the Manhattan Project) 
has been repeatedly relentlessly in America's public discourse. From President Nixon's explicit 
evocation of Apollo in launching Project (energy) Independence in 1973,1 to President Obama's 
references to Apollo on the campaign trail in 2008,2 no image has been used more often with 
respect to energy development, particularly the development of alternative energy technologies. 
Apollo has already served as the model for many major alternative energy programs. Just as 
President Kennedy announced early in the 1960s that the US would put a man on the moon by the 
end of the decade, so other US presidents have embarked on grand alternative energy schemes to 
achieve x by time y. These efforts have never succeeded and have cost literally billions of dollars. 
Current programs such as the ethanol mandate of 2007 are likely to waste still more billions in the 
years ahead ( Hahn, 2008; Grossman, 2008). 
The Apollo analogy is, in fact, both inapt and unhelpful to the creation of effective energy policies. 
The analogy, or what I call “the Apollo fallacy,” conflates an engineering problem with a 
commercial problem, and it deflects efforts away from scientific advance and focuses them instead 
on grandiose social results. The goal of Apollo was simply to prove that the US could accomplish 
the spectacular achievement of putting people on the moon and bringing them home safely. Cost 
was not consequential nor was the feat meant to become a regular function of the marketplace. 
Certainly, President Kennedy never stipulated that lunar vacations become an ordinary consumer 
choice. Indeed, if the goal of Apollo had been to create cost effective commercial lunar tourism, it 
would have to be judged a colossal waste of money. 
Alternative energy technologies, however, are intended to be more than demonstration projects. 
Most of these technologies can already be engineered. Synthetic fuels, solar thermal hot water 
heating, solar photovoltaic electricity, electric automobiles, 80 m/g (approximately 35 km/L) 
autos, cellulosic ethanol have all been demonstrated. The goal of government programs has been 
to make these programs commercially viable. That is, every program has set out to create a new 
technology that would be cost competitive with the conventional technology or resource it was 
intended to replace. 
But often government programs have actually retarded commercial development of the 
technologies they were supposed to advance. In 1977, for example, President Carter asked for tax 
credits to promote home solar thermal hot water and space heating systems. His stated goal was 
the installation of 2.5 million units by 1985.3 This effort actually hurt the solar industry. The 
program was announced in April 1977 but passed in November 1978. Consumers waited for 
passage of the tax law, which caused serious losses in the meantime for producers (Business Week, 
1979). But their distress in the mid-1980s was far greater when markets showed that most of the 
assumptions on which Carter's policy was based were wrong. Contrary to the government's 
expectations, the price of conventional resources did not rise; in fact they fell significantly. And 
the technology did not advance sufficiently to make consumers confident that they would have 
value for their investment. Even before the tax breaks were eliminated in 1986, it was clear that 
the original goal would not even be approached. According to an industry history, few 
manufacturers survived by the end of the decade.4 
It should be noted that the Carter administration did not explicitly link solar energy development 
to the Apollo Program until several months after passage of the tax credits,5 but the program was 
Apollo-like in its over-ambitious technological-commercial goal with a timetable to achievement. 
In general though, programs like solar heating, and now electric cars, have tried to alter the energy 
marketplace through un-Apollo-like incentives directly to consumers. Still, government forecasts 
for such programs have been extravagant, unrealistic and seemingly oblivious to the actual 
processes of technological adoption. While an argument can be made for the use of tax credits for 
some types of energy projects (particularly for R&D itself), their successful use in a consumer 
program is necessarily uncertain because technological adoption rests on the consumer's belief 
both that the new technology will be cost effective and that it will perform well over time. Cost 
effectiveness is not, as the solar program demonstrated, guaranteed by tax preferences; even with 
tax breaks consumers will be cautious about spending thousands of their own dollars. And 
operating performance can only be assessed after years, often decades of experience. In fact, 
experience with other technologies suggests that even if the forecasts of cost effectiveness had 
been correct, most consumers would have waited to purchase until solar's long-term operating 
efficiency had been demonstrated.6 
Other US government alternative energy programs have more directly followed the Apollo model: 
through legislation, significant sums of money have been appropriated to force the creation of 
commercially viable energy alternatives. This model has been followed most notably with 
synfuels, nuclear fusion, and the 80 m/g “super car.” In each case, large sums were authorized and 
timetables set with specific benchmarks of achievement. Each of these technologies was expected 
to achieve large-scale displacement of conventional resources or the technologies that used them. 
Yet like the incentive-based solar program, all failed to achieve their objectives and the programs 
were downgraded or eliminated as costs mounted and results proved disappointing. 
The failure of the “super car” is instructive as to the limits of the Apollo model, which was 
specifically invoked in a press release from the Clinton White House when the effort was launched 
in 1993.7 The program, a partnership of government and the big three US automakers, was 
supposed to create a new kind of car that would supplant the standard internal combustion family 
car. With $1.5 billion in development funds, the partnership for a new generation of vehicles 
(PNGV) was to have produced an affordable 80 m/g car by 2004. After the program was shuttered 
in 2001, the National Research Council declared that no “reasonable” amount of additional funding 
would get the project any closer to achieving its original goal; the project needed “breakthrough 
ideas” that more money simply could not buy (National Research Council, 2002). 
The Apollo fallacy has been detrimental to the development of effective energy policies in the US 
instead of asking what kinds of programs might be useful, the government holds out the promise 
of a technological panacea to be delivered simply by an act of Congress. The prospect of an energy 
panacea actually has some political benefits (Grossman, 2009).8 It allows politicians to claim that 
they can provide simultaneously the two outcomes most Americans seek from energy policy: low 
energy prices and energy independence. In fact, with conventional resources these goals are 
mutually exclusive. To get low prices, the government should provide incentives to drill for oil 
and gas not just in the US but also in places where they might be exploited more cheaply—of 
course making the nation more dependent on outside sources. To lessen dependence (true energy 
autarky is not a feasible goal) on foreign resources, the only method the government can use with 
conventional resources is to raise prices through taxes. But a new technology presumably can do 
both at once: provide cheap, US-made energy (Grossman, 2009). Unfortunately, the history of 
energy programs argues that the pursuit of a technological-commercial panacea will fail. 
This suggests the need for a more modest kind of energy program. Instead of unrealistic goals set 
at millions of units, tax credits might simply be presented as a way to encourage substitution when 
market conditions generally are favorable. Instead of grand schemes, the government can expand 
(and sustain) research budgets to fund a variety of ideas both for new technologies and for such 
mundane efforts as efficiency improvements in conventional technologies. A study of the costs 
and benefits of government energy spending from 1980 to 2000 found that large benefits came 
from research to improve the efficiency of refrigerators and window insulation (Fri, 2006). 
The government can take one kind of action that might over time encourage commercially viable 
alternative energy products: impose significant taxes on conventional resources. This would give 
inventors and entrepreneurs confidence that any technological gains would not simply be 
swallowed up by price changes in conventional resource markets. Of course, such tax policies 
while providing incentives do not guarantee innovation. High prices are at least as likely to lead to 
conservation as innovation. In any case, on a practical level, it is doubtful that there exists the 
political will in the US to impose them. President Clinton's effort to increase gas taxes by just 
4.3 cents/g faced significant political opposition and was a contentious campaign issue in the 1994 
and 1996 elections (Sullivan, 2008). 
Perhaps the most crucial role for government is in creating the institutional environment that will 
allow innovation to succeed. As scholars in many disciplines have noted, rules—customary 
practices as well as formal laws—can block market access to new entrants or lead to technological 
lock in, thwarting adoption even of innovations that could be commercially viable.9 Changes in 
US laws on market access to decentralized electrical generating sources, for example, have to some 
extent improved the prospects for wind energy development in the US. At the same time, access 
across the US is not entirely uniform since it depends not only on national law but also on state 
and local laws and on social attitudes, any of which can halt the diffusion process (Bohn and Lant, 
2009). Clear and uniform rules would probably improve wind energy's prospects but even that 
may not be enough in places where there are significant social barriers to adoption. 
Still, as most researchers understand, technological-commercial progress is not guaranteed with 
favorable rules or with taxes or with an expanded research agenda or, as this paper has argued, 
with grandiose visions and massive appropriations. Politicians may make innumerable references 
to the Apollo Program and pass laws relating to energy accordingly, but the references and the 
laws will not mean that any of their goals are achievable. The Apollo moon landing was a 
magnificent feat, but one that carries essentially no useful lesson for energy policy-making—
except perhaps the lesson that it does not apply. 
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